Execution flow hijack attempt
Table of Contents
Self.Hosted 22.06 (EoL)
Expand all | Collapse all
-
- Getting started
- System Requirements
- Prisma Cloud container images
- Onebox
- Kubernetes
- OpenShift v4
- Console on Fargate
- Amazon ECS
- Alibaba Cloud Container Service for Kubernetes (ACK)
- Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS)
- Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS)
- Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE)
- Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) Autopilot
- IBM Kubernetes Service (IKS)
- Windows
- Defender types
- Cluster Context
-
- Install a single Container Defender
- Automatically Install Container Defender in a Cluster
- App-Embedded Defender
- App-Embedded Defender for Fargate
- Default setting for App-Embedded Defender file system protection
- VMware Tanzu Application Service (TAS) Defender
- Serverless Defender
- Serverless Defender as a Lambda layer
- Auto-defend serverless functions
- Install a single Host Defender
- Auto-defend hosts
- Deploy Prisma Cloud Defender from the GCP Marketplace
- Decommission Defenders
- Redeploy Defenders
- Uninstall Defenders
-
- Rule ordering and pattern matching
- Backup and restore
- Custom feeds
- Configuring Prisma Cloud proxy settings
- Prisma Cloud Compute certificates
- Configure Agentless Scanning
- Agentless Scanning Modes
- Configure scanning
- User certificate validity period
- Enable HTTP access to Console
- Set different paths for Defender and Console (with DaemonSets)
- Authenticate to Console with certificates
- Configure custom certs from a predefined directory
- Customize terminal output
- Collections
- Tags
- Logon settings
- Reconfigure Prisma Cloud
- Subject Alternative Names
- WildFire Settings
- Log Scrubbing
- Clustered-DB
- Permissions by feature
-
- Logging into Prisma Cloud
- Integrating with an IdP
- Integrate with Active Directory
- Integrate with OpenLDAP
- Integrate Prisma Cloud with Open ID Connect
- Integrate with Okta via SAML 2.0 federation
- Integrate Google G Suite via SAML 2.0 federation
- Integrate with Azure Active Directory via SAML 2.0 federation
- Integrate with PingFederate via SAML 2.0 federation
- Integrate with Windows Server 2016 & 2012r2 Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) via SAML 2.0 federation
- Integrate Prisma Cloud with GitHub
- Integrate Prisma Cloud with OpenShift
- Non-default UPN suffixes
- Compute user roles
- Assign roles
- Credentials store
- Cloud accounts
-
- Prisma Cloud vulnerability feed
- Vulnerability Explorer
- Vulnerability management rules
- Search CVEs
- Scan reports
- Scanning procedure
- Customize image scanning
- Configure Registry Scans
-
- Scan Images in Sonatype Nexus Registry
- Scan images in Alibaba Cloud Container Registry
- Scan images in Amazon EC2 Container Registry (ECR)
- Scan images in Azure Container Registry (ACR)
- Scan images in Docker Registry v2 (including Docker Hub)
- Scan images in Google Artifact Registry
- Scan images in Google Container Registry (GCR)
- Scan images in Harbor Registry
- Scan images in IBM Cloud Container Registry
- Scan images in Artifactory Docker Registry
- Scan images in OpenShift integrated Docker registry
- Trigger registry scans with Webhooks
- Base images
- Configure VM image scanning
- Configure code repository scanning
- Agentless scanning
- Malware scanning
- Vulnerability risk tree
- Vulnerabilities Detection
- CVSS scoring
- Windows container image scanning
- Serverless function scanning
- VMware Tanzu blobstore scanning
- Scan App-Embedded workloads
- Troubleshoot vulnerability detection
-
- Compliance Explorer
- Enforce compliance checks
- CIS Benchmarks
- Prisma Cloud Labs compliance checks
- Serverless functions compliance checks
- Windows compliance checks
- DISA STIG compliance checks
- Custom compliance checks
- Trusted images
- Host scanning
- VM image scanning
- App-Embedded scanning
- Detect secrets
- Cloud discovery
- OSS license management
- API
End-of-Life (EoL)
Execution flow hijack attempt
An execution flow hijack attempt incident indicates that a possible attempt to hijack a program execution flow was observed. Special Linux library system files, which have a system-wide effect, were altered (this is usually undesirable, and is typically employed only as an emergency remedy or maliciously).
Investigation
The following incident shows that the binary sudo wrote to ld.so.preload file, which is a special Linux system file that impacts the entire system. By editing the Linux dynamic loader or files relied upon by the loader such as ld.so.preload, the attacker can inject malicious code to any binary execution.
For further information about these files, see the following link.

Your investigation should focus on:
- Determining the process that opened the Special Linux file.
- If the source of the alteration was an interactive process (such as shell), determine how an attacker gained access to that process.
- Review the forensics date for the host, other entries in the Incident Explorer, and audits from the source, looking for unusual process execution, hijacked processes, and explicit execution of commands.
Mitigation
A full mitigation strategy for this incident begins by resolving the issues that allowed the attacker to access and modify the system file.
In addition, track the change that was done to the configuration in the system file. For example, in case of detected modification to the ld.so.preload file, look for the shared library that was added to the file and determine the source of this malicious shared library.
Ensure that compliance benchmarks are appropriately applied to the affected resources. For example, if the critical file systems in the host are mounted read-only, it will be more difficult for an attacker to change system files and configurations to their advantage.