Post-quantum RFC 8784 pre-shared keys make IKEv2 VPNs resistant to attacks by quantum
computers.
| Where Can I Use This? | What Do I Need? |
Post-quantum IKEv2 VPNs based on
RFC 8784 work by transmitting a pre-shared secret
separately (out-of-band) from the initial peering exchange (the IKE_SA_INIT
Exchange). Instead of transmitting the pre-shared secret in the peering exchange,
which an attacker could compromise or harvest now and decrypt later, the peering
exchange only transmits a Key ID. A Key ID and a pre-shared secret comprise a unique
pair called a post-quantum pre-shared key (PQ PPK).
Each IKEv2 peer uses the Key ID to look up the pre-shared secret, which is
transmitted securely between administrators or pushed by Panorama, and stored
locally on each IKEv2 peer. The pre-shared key is never part of the peering exchange
and never traverses the post-quantum VPN, so an attacker using a quantum computer
can't steal it, crack it, and use it to decrypt data harvested from a VPN.
Both IKEv2 peers must have the same active pairs of Key ID plus pre-shared secret so
that when peers negotiate the connection, each peer can look up the same Key ID and
retrieve the same pre-shared secret. If the responding peer doesn't have a matching
Key ID or if the pre-shared secret associated with the Key ID differs from the
initiator, the connection is aborted.
Set up IKEv2 peering and an IPSec tunnel
before configuring post-quantum components. Additionally, ensure you have Security
policy rules that permit the IKEv2 and IPSec traffic between the firewalls and
enable logging.
Dynamic peer IKE gateways on the same local IP address must
use the same IKE Crypto profiles and have identical Enable NAT
Traversal, Post-Quantum Pre-Shared Key (PPK),
Enable Post-Quantum Pre-Shared Key (PPK), and
Negotiation Mode settings.
To make your IKEv2 VPNs resistant to quantum attacks: